from them? Should the government protect home buyers from the cognitive errors and emotions that lead them to sign mortgage documents before reading them because the stack of documents is too high and the emotional pull of home ownership is too strong?
Steve Sanders (2007) , a mortgage banker, noted that signing mortgage documents would have taken a day and one half if signers were actually reading the documents before signing them. "After witnessing literally thousands of signings," he wrote, " I will tell you that most people are so focused on getting into their new home that they have no idea what it was they just signed." And should the government protect us, the neighbors of foolish Should the government protect financial engineers from the cognitive errors that lead them to faulty models? "To confuse the model with the world is to embrace a future disaster driven by the belief that humans obey mathematical rules," said Emanuel Derman, a former managing director of Goldman Sachs to Lohr (2008) . "Complexity, transparency, liquidity and leverage have all played a huge role in this crisis," added Leslie Rahl, president of Capital Market Risk Advisors "And these are things that are not generally modeled as a quantifiable risk." Should the government protect investors from the consequences of actions by financial engineers by, for example, regulating leverage which magnifies the consequences of erroneous models? And should the government intervene directly in companies, bailing out banks and automobile companies with taxpayers' money and assuming ownership stakes in them?
Governments' regulations constrain otherwise free markets, and direct intervention pushes us even further away from free markets. Changes in regulations and interventions over time reveal continuing attempts by society, through its legislative process, to find the right spot in a tug-of-war between those who pull toward the free-markets end and those who pull toward the regulated markets and direct intervention end. At the extreme left are those who pull toward completely regulated markets and comprehensive paternalism, and at the extreme right are those who pull toward completely free markets and comprehensive libertarianism. But members of each group do not fully agree about how to pull the tug-ofwar rope and how far to pull it. Only few want to pull the tug-of-war rope all the way to the left where most enterprises are owned by the government and regulations proscribe most transactions. And only few want to pull the rope all the way to the right, leaving no role for government. Instead, the tug-of-war is fought mostly in the middle, where groups pull left or right but not all the way to the left and right extremes. Those pulling toward regulations want regulations they consider helpful and effective, say mandatory disclosure of information about mortgages, but not regulations they consider excessive, say prohibition of some mortgages. Those pulling toward free markets want markets to be helpful and productive, say a free market in derivatives, but not necessarily a free market in cocaine.
Members of each group, motivated by ideology or self-interest, try to enlist legislators and the general public into their groups. Historical accidents, such as stock market crashes and economic recessions, attract members to one group or another, boosting its power and tugging the rope left or right. New self-interest groups form once new regulations are enacted, new historical accidents occur, and the tug-of-war continues.
This was true when the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 were enacted during the Great Depression, when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was signed into law during the boom of 1999, repealing portions of the Glass-Steagall Act, when SOX was enacted after the 2000 crash, and most recently when financial institutions were bailed out and their regulation tightened in the late 2000s crisis.
The tug-of-war has been fought for centuries. In 1900, Charles R. Flint, the organizer of the United States Rubber Company, spoke for free markets and libertarianism and against regulated markets and paternalism. "My idea," he said, "is that affairs of trade are best regulated by natural law. The careless banker has lost his reputation; the careless investor has lost his money; and the result of it is, more care will be taken."
1 However, others were unwilling to leave the protection of the investor to the libertarian "natural law"
of the marketplace and recommended paternalistic Blue Sky laws instead.
The price of Kansas farmland more than doubled from 1900 to 1910 and the new prosperity attracted investment promoters. Bateman (1973) quoted a commentator at the time: "The state of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific and rich in farming products, had a large proportion of agriculturists not versed in ordinary business methods. The State was the happy hunting ground of promoters of fraudulent enterprises; in fact, their frauds 1 (Carosso 1970, p. 160) became so barefaced that it was stated that they would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple. Blue sky laws have changed much during the intervening decades, the result of a tug-of-war between those who want to make them more stringent and those who want to abolish them altogether. Sosin and Fein (1987) Two particular concerns underlie the drive to regulate margin and limit it, one about the damage investors can inflict on themselves, and one about the damage they can inflict on others. Limits on margin were deemed necessary to protect investors from the cognitive errors and imperfect self-control that lead them to speculation facilitated by margin. And limits on margin were deemed necessary to protect others from spillovers caused by investors using margin. The alleged spillovers include increased volatility and diversion of credit from productive investments to speculative activities.
Protection of investors from their own cognitive errors and imperfect self-control is and Miller (1990) , Moore (1966), and Officer (1973) failed to link the two, although
Hardouvalis ( shifted tug-of-war power from those who pull toward free markets and libertarianism to those who pull toward regulated markets and paternalism. Those pulling for regulated markets are attempting to use their newfound power to extend margin regulations to financial institutions and homeowners, beyond stocks, so as to protect them from their own cognitive errors and imperfect self-control, and protect the rest of us from them.
Suitability regulations
'Cheat me once, shame on you, cheat me twice, shame on me.' Free markets and libertarian societies are not without restraint. We prefer to stay away not only from those who have cheated us but also from those who fail to nurture a reputation for honesty and fair dealing. This preference provides an incentive for honesty and fair dealing even in the absence of regulations mandating it.
Reputation can sustain trust in free markets. Jacob Schiff, an investment banker at the turn of the 20 th Century, attributed the growth of investment banking at his time and the prominence of firms like his own to "the fact that they have been more honest than those who, thirty and twenty years ago, were among the leading banking firms. Not more honest, as construed in the literal sense of the word, but honest in their respect for the moral obligation assumed toward those who entrusted their financial affairs to them, be it investing in the securities of corporate enterprises which these bankers brought before the public, or otherwise; more honest in keeping their own capital from becoming immobile, so that their credit and prestige should not be called into question during times of financial peril and uncertainty; more honest in the ways which, not taking alone into account the monetary pecuniary profit, are certain, in the long run, to determine position, credit, and prestige." (Carosso (1970) "Do you believe that an administrative officer of the Government ought to be given that much power, as a general principle -to pass upon whether or not a man's business is based on sound principles? It is mighty easy when you go to write a statute, if you want to delegate absolute authority; you can write that in a very short statute; but the question that this committee has got to determine is whether or not you want to give anybody that kind of authority. (p. 56)
Roosevelt pulled toward mandatory disclosure and away from blue sky because he shared Rayburn's view that mandatory disclosure is better but also because passage of a bill founded on mandatory disclosure would have been faster than passage of a bill founded on blue sky, and the 1933 Act embodies the spirit of mandatory disclosure.
Roosevelt wrote: "The Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit. There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be The Wall Street Journal is right to be wary of overreaction that would pull us too close to the extreme regulation end in the tug-of-war. But there is also a danger in not pulling far enough toward that end. We cannot be blind to the systemic risk cascading from free but unwise behavior by some of us to disastrous consequences inflicted on all of us.
We know now that the actions of homeowners who overloaded themselves with mortgages inflicted major collateral damage. And we know now that so did actions of financial institutions who overloaded themselves with leveraged mortgage securities. As President
Bush noted, the government has moved some way toward the regulation and direct intervention ends, and I think that these moves are wise.
Regulations are not all equally good and we must choose the best among them by comparing burdens to benefits, however imprecisely. There are benefits to increasing home ownership by increasing the availability of mortgages even to subprime borrowers. Brownstein (1999) noted that homeowners are more likely than renters to participate in their communities and the children of homeowners tend to perform better in school.
Moreover, increased homeownership allows minority families who have accumulated far less wealth than whites to accumulate wealth and transmit it to future generations. But now we know that while mortgages extended to subprime borrowers can fulfill the American dream, mortgages extended to homeowners who lack the income to support them impose nightmarish burdens on these homeowners and the rest of us.
Regulations prohibiting mortgages with low teaser rates are burdensome to some potential homeowners and they exclude others from homeownership, but the benefits of such regulations likely exceed their burdens. The same is true for regulations limiting home leverage by specifying that down payments be no less than 20 percent. Such regulations should be accompanied by policies that equalize government benefits to homeowners and renters so as to reduce the disadvantage imposed on those who must rent because they cannot afford to buy. Policies might include reductions in the tax benefits afforded to homeowners or subsidies afforded to renters.
I would also advocate the application of suitability regulations to mortgage brokers, bankers, and other providers of mortgages. Mandatory disclosure of mortgage facts, even if done in mandated formats that aid comprehension, is insufficient because it leaves lenders and borrowers in adversary positions. We can see the effect of these adversary positions in all credit markets, including the credit card and mortgage markets. The Truth-in-Lending
Act mandates disclosure of interest rates in the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) format, and there is evidence that consumers are indeed using APR numbers in comparison shopping.
But APR is not the total cost of a loan and interest payments are not the total revenue of lenders. Credit card companies circumvent the spirit of Truth-in-Lending by adding late fees, over-limit fees, and other fees which are disclosed, but not in ways that make them easy to find. Even clear disclosure of such fees is not likely to be sufficient. Credit card applicants might be confident in their ability to pay balances in full and on time, but credit card companies know that such confidence is commonly misplaced and that interest and late fees would generate greater revenues than applicants anticipate. Mortgage loans are different from credit card loans mostly by their much higher dollar amounts and the much greater damage they can inflict on borrowers and on the rest of us. Suitability regulations would require that lenders not only disclose clearly all information about credit products but also guide borrowers to suitable ones. The burdens of suitability regulations in the credit card market might be higher than their benefits, but the benefits of suitability regulations in the mortgage market likely exceed their burdens. and much harm in allowing financial institutions to leverage mortgages and other securities without limit.
Conclusion
In 1999 Senator Gramm spearheaded the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act which lightened regulation, repealing regulatory barriers erected by 1933 Glass-Steagall Act to reduce the risk of economic catastrophes by separating commercial banks from investment banks.
Senator Gramm is a Republican, but support for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act extended beyond his party. The Act was signed into law by President Clinton, a Democrat.
We should not be surprised to learn that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in 1999, knowing that 1999 was at the top end of a financial and economic boom.
Financial and economic booms shift tug-of-war power from those who pull toward paternalism and heavy regulation to those who pull for libertarianism and free or lightly regulated markets. Now, in a year at the bottom end of a financial and economic bust, power is shifting to those who pull toward paternalism and heavy regulation.
History tells that we tend to overreact, urging legislators and government executives to pull too far toward the paternalistic end when we are fearful and too far toward the libertarian end when we are exuberant. There is danger in pulling too far toward one end or the other, but there is also danger in not pulling far enough. The pull toward the libertarian and lightly regulated end stoked the stock bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble of the 2000s. Some urge us to stop pulling toward the paternalistic end once we have reached mandatory disclosure to investors and mandatory transparency in financial institutions and markets, often quoting Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 1914 proclamation that the sunlight of disclosure is the best disinfectant. But today, almost a century after Brandeis' declaration, we know that our hospitals need more than sunshine as a disinfector, and that diseases can spread rapidly even when only relatively few forego immunization. Mandatory disclosure might keep most of us economically healthy most of the time, but we need the economic equivalent of mandatory immunization to prevent the carelessness of some from infecting us all.
